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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
 FROM AMBASSADOR MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT :MWA
 SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR BOSNIA:

1. ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to use American air power to supplement an enhanced UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia and Serbia.

2. BACKGROUND

We have never tested the proposition that American military intervention might intimidate the Bosnian Serb militia and their patrons in Belgrade. That premise should be tested. Air power supporting an UNPROFOR presence in key Muslim enclaves ought to create a doubt in Serbian minds that they can pursue their objectives unchecked, a doubt that certainly does not exist today. If this is true, then we would be in a better position to bring pressure to bear on the Serbs to cease their aggressive behavior and sign the peace accords.

A military package which includes air strikes and internationalization of the enclaves could collaterally facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to besieged civilian populations and aid in the defense of civilians under military attack, one of our highest priorities.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Frank Perez,
Senior Reviewer

3. U.S. OPTIONS

On February 10, the Secretary outlined a six point program for dealing with Bosnia. Since that time our options have been narrowed while the situation gets worse. Our objective was to level the playing field for the Bosnian Muslims, but while we have made significant progress on the six points, the tide of battle now calls into question the very survival of Bosnia.

Lifting the arms embargo, almost our only remaining publicly announced option, is our greatest threat, but it also has the greatest potential cost and may be the hardest to accomplish. Once we lift the arms embargo, we lose control of what would certainly be a flow of Muslim weapons, not only into Bosnia, but also into the surrounding area. The consequences of more arms could have significant ramifications for neighboring countries.

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4. OBJECTIVES

The limited objectives of air power -- unilateral or multilateral -- should include:

- 1) To get the Serbs to sign the agreement.
- 2) To demonstrate the commitment and will of the U.S. to prevent "ethnic cleansing" and erase its effects.
- 3) To help defend remaining Bosnian Muslim enclaves.
- 4) To provide retaliation in the event that Bosnia Serb military actions prevent humanitarian land convoys.
- 5) To help protect UNPROFOR from Serb retaliation.

Two significantly more controversial objectives would be:

- 6) To strike at Serbian military assets that are being used in an aggressive manner in Bosnia or from Serbia.
- 7) To strike at Bosnian Serb strategic targets (i.e. power nodes, communications and infrastructure in cities like Banja Luka) to demonstrate a real cost for continued aggression.

5. AUTHORITY


Recognizing that legal authority alone will not provide a receptive political environment, a strong case can be made that sufficient authority already exists under Article 51 of the Charter and the Chapter VII provisions of UNSC resolution 770 to employ air power for at least objectives (1) through (5) and perhaps (6) and (7), without obtaining new and explicit Security Council approval.

Having said this, we have to recognize that public denial of our authority by the Secretary-General or by the United Kingdom and France, would severely undercut our case that we have international support or authority for our actions. We may be able to get the support of our allies and possibly the UN Secretary-General, but only if we are willing to commit adequate U.S. military assets to do the job.

6. CONSEQUENCES

Air strikes could result in shutting down the land operations by humanitarian agencies and the United Nations and change the nature and role of UNPROFOR. But neither

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institution has the current capability to do much except to extend the demise of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today the reality is that humanitarian operations are increasingly being blocked on the ground by Bosnian Serb action.

Further delay in applying a genuine military component to the Bosnian situation risks humanitarian catastrophe for Bosnian Muslims and the total collapse of most of Bosnia to Serb control. Failure to act will embolden the Serbs to overwhelm remaining pockets of Bosnian Muslims, target Bosnian Croatian-controlled regions, consolidate control over areas of Croatia still held by Serbs (like Krajina), and threaten Kosovo and Macedonia.

7. SUPPORTING INITIATIVE

If we are prepared to use air power, I would recommend a further initiative which would supplement and enhance the effectiveness of our control of the skies.

-- We should create United Nations Protected Enclaves. The creation of United Nations protected enclaves (defended by U.S./NATO/Russian forces under an UNPROFOR label) and supported by U.S. air power will be the only way to add the necessary ground component capable of saving these towns and regions from Serb intervention and assault. This would be similar to the security zone created in northern Iraq in 1991. Embassy Belgrade has strongly recommended that Srebrenica be declared a UN-protected area.

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